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CHAPTER
Metamemory19
John Dunlosky and Keith W Thiede
Abstract
Metamemory refers to people's beliefs about their memory and to how people monitor and control
their learning and retrieval. In this chapter, we describe monitoring and control processes involved
in learning and retrieval, how these processes have been measured, and key outcomes relevant to
human metamemory. Based on these outcomes, general conclusions include the following: (a) people's
judgments of their memory are based on a variety of cues; hence (b) judgment accuracy arises from
the diagnosticity of the cues, so that above-chance accuracy of any metamemory judgment only arises
when the available cues are predictive (or diagnostic) of criterion performance; and finally, (c) people
use their memory judgments to guide their study and retrieval. Thus, people's memory monitoring
plays a pivotal role in the effectiveness of their self-regulated learning and retrieval, so a major aim
of metamemory research is to discover techniques that yield high levels of judgment accuracy and
optimal regulation.
Key Words: metamemory, self-regulated learning, memory monitoring, control, judgments of
learning, feeling of knowing, confidence judgments, metacognition
Metamemory refers to people's thoughts about
their memory and how memory operates. Although
the term metamemory may seem esoteric to some,
people rely on their metamemory as they perform
many activities. When heading to a grocery store,
one person may believe that he can remember all 10
{ems that need to be purchased, whereas another
person with the same items to purchase may believe
that her memory will fail and hence decides to take
1 list along. An eyewitness may point the finger at
the accused, and do so with extreme confidence that
the accused had committed the crime; however,
such high confidence can be illusory, such as when
confidence is inadvertently based on a memory
of seeing the accused in a lineup instead of actu-
ally witnessing the accused commit the crime (for
real-life examples, see Loftus & Ketcham, 1991).
Unfortunately, jurors believe the testimony of a
highly confident eyewitness, regardless of whether
his or her confidence is well placed. On a lighter
note, when playing games (such as Trivial Pursuit),
players may withhold answers when they believe
that those answers are wrong, yet they will try to
persuade their team to respond with an answer
when their confidence in it is high. And when fail-
ing to generate answers to some questions, an emo-
tionally charged tip-of-the-tongue state may arise
when they believe the sought-after answer is avail-
able in memory. Being a student can put an even
higher premium on the effective use of metamem-
ory, because to learn efficiently, students must be
able to accurately judge how well key concepts have
been learned and make appropriate decisions about
which concepts require further study.
hort list illustrates several metamemory
rocesses that can occur while people are learning
, materials or are attempting to retrieve old ones.
ioreo\'er, rhey illustrate the multifaceted nature
0- metarnernory, which includes knowledge (and
beliefs) abour memory, moniroring of memory, and
control of memory. Metamemory knowledge refers ro
lara rive knowledge or beliefs that an individual
holds about how memory operates and whether
those beliefs are accurate. In the earlier example, the
individual who decided ro write down the grocery
u t may know from experience that memory tends
to fail after four or five items from a grocery list need
to be remembered. The individual who went with-
out a list may believe that he has a very good memo-
ry-s-thar is, he has high memory self-efficacy-and
hence will be able to recall even lengthier lists with-
our having difficulties.
Memory monitoring refers to assessing progress
during learning or the current state of a previ-
ously studied item. For example, when studying
for an upcoming test, students may attempt to
monitor and evaluate their ongoing progress
while studying. Their moniroring of memory
yields a confidence judgment about whether they
will remember the key concepts on the upcoming
exam. Finally, memory control involves regulating
any aspect of learning or retrieval. For the con-
rrol of learning, one example of a control process
includes deciding to spend more time studying
materials that one believes have not been well
learned. For retrieval, accusing a defendant of
committing a crime is a prime example, because
the eyewitness allegedly must be highly confident
in his or her memory of the crime to potentially
condemn the defendant.
Based on these examples, it may be evident
why so many people have become interested in
metamemory: Faulty metamemory can lead to
poor memory and low achievement, whereas
accurate metamemory can enhance memory and
achievement. For instance, if students inaccu-
rately assess that they are ready for an upcoming
test, then they may prematurely stop studying.
In this case, poor monitoring leads to a nonopti-
mal control decision, which in turn would lead to
less-than-expected performance on the examina-
tion. To expand on this example, consider two stu-
dents who are studying for an upcoming test in a
class of introductory psychology. Both students are
trying to learn the core concepts relevant to mem-
ory. such as what is short-term memory, long-term
memory, and encoding specificity. Both students
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judge thar they will be able to remember about
90% of the concepts, which they believe is fine for
the test, so rhey stop studying to join each other
for a late-night movie. Whereas Julie actually will
retain 90% of the concepts (her judgments were
accurate), Mike was highly overconfident and will
remember only 50%. In this case, Mike was over-
confident and hence he stopped studying before he
met his desired learning goal; unfortunately, Mike
will not perform well on the test, and he may even
tell the teacher, "But I thought I knew all these
concepts. Why did I earn such a poor grade on
the exam?"
Although the importance of accurate metamern-
ory may be intuitive, research in this area did not
begin in earnest until about 1970 when John Flavell
coined the term "meramemory." In the 1970s, the
term "meta" began to appear in articles and in con-
ference papers, and groundbreaking research was
also conducted by John Flavell, Ellen Markman, and
Ann Brown, among others. Perhaps most important
for solidifying a specialized field of metamemory
was Flavell's (1979) American Psychologist article,
called "Metacognition and Cognitive Moniroring:
A New Area of Cognitive-Developmental Inquiry."
This article has been highly influential because it is
here where Flavell defines core concepts for the field,
such as metacognitive knowledge and metacogni-
tive experiences (which are most closely aligned
with metamemory knowledge and memory moni-
toting, as described earlier). As important, he devel-
oped numerous testable hyporheses about how the
development of merarnernory in childhood would
in turn influence the developmental progress of core
cognitive processes.
John Flavell and his colleagues-most nota-
bly, Henry Wellman-first captured our attention
with persuasive arguments about the importance
of rnetamemory, but it was Joseph Hart who pro-
vided the first method to assess metamemory in an
objective manner. One can best understand Hart's
breakthrough within the context of the introspec-
tion method that was used in the infancy of psy-
chological research. In the early 1900s, a researcher
interested in associations may ask a (trained) par-
ticipant to introspect about the psychological pro-
cesses that produce a free association. For instance,
what is the first word that comes to mind when
you read "guitar"? Perhaps you think "Stratocasrer,"
but if you were an introspectionist, you would also
need to describe the cognitive processes that pre-
ceded the thought "Stratocaster." Doing so may
seem difficult, but participants in these studies (at
rimes the experimenters themselves) were highly
practiced. A downfall of this method was that the
introspective reports were viewed as a window
into the mind; that is, the reports were assumed
by some to be accurate and complete. This view
is most evident in R. S. Woodworth's (1921) defi-
nition of introspection as the "observation by an
individual of his own conscious action ... Notice
that it is a form of observation, and not specu-
lation or reasoning from past experience. It is a
direct observation of fact" (p. 10). This definition
emphasizes introspection as a metacognitive act,
because introspection involves directly observing
a mental action. Unfortunately, even in 1901, it
vas evident that introspective methods would fall
. 'ell short of direct observation of mental actions
involved in a response (for a historical review, see
Humphrey, 1951).
Six decades later, Joseph Hart introduced a
method to systematically explore distortions in
people's introspections about their memory. In par-
ticular, participants were asked general-information
questions. When they did not answer a question,
they were simply asked to predict whether they could
choose the correct answer on a multiple-choice rec-
ognition test. These predictions-which are called
.7eling-ofknowing (FOK) judgments-are intro-
pecrive reports, but in contrast to earlier intro-
spection research, Hart (1965) did not assume that
they were valid, Instead, he evaluated their accuracy
against objective performance by administering
recognition tests. By doing so, people's judgments
could be validated against their performance: When
they were in a tip-of-the-tongue state and were sure
they knew the correct answer even when they could
not retrieve it, would they then recognize the cor-
rect answer? Hart (1965, 1966) found that people's
?OK judgments showed above-chance accuracy.
That is, their judgments were higher for correctly
recognized answers than for ones that were not
ecognized.
Hart's methods focused on the monitoring
of retrieval, as measured by FOK judgments.
The method is invaluable because it has allowed
researchers to systematically explore the biases in
people's FOK judgments, which we consider in
some detail later. As important, his methods can be
readily applied to evaluate how people monitor all
aspects of learning-from study through retrieval,
And extensions of his methods have been used to
explore people's control of study and retrieval. In
:he remainder of this chapter, we first provide a
ird's eye view of the kinds of monitoring and
control processes investigated in the field, We then
discuss current theory pertaining to two widely
investigated metamemory judgments relevant to
study and retrieval: judgments of learning (JOLs)
and FOK judgments, respectively.
In 1990, Nelson and Narens unified the field of
metamemory by organizing the various monitoring
and control processes into a single framework. An
expanded version of this framework is presented in
Figure 19.1, which illustrates measures of memory
monitoring and memory control that correspond
to each phase of learning. For instance, during
study ("acquisition" in Fig. 19.1), one may monitor
memory for to-be-learned items, which is measured
by having people judge how well an item has been
learned. This JOL may also influence the control of
study, such as by informing people's decisions about
when to terminate study of a given item. The mea-
sures depicting memory monitoring are presented
in the top portion of Figure 19.1, and the measures
depicting memory control are presented in the bot-
tom portion. Definitions of each measure are in
Table 19.1.
Modern research on metamemory largely
focuses on answering just a few questions about
monitoring and control. Concerning memory
monitoring, one primary question is, How do
people monitor various phases of learning?
Answers to this question are obtained by investi-
gating how people make the various monitoring
judgments. For instance, JOLs are investigated to
understand how people monitor their learning,
whereas confidence judgments and FOK judg-
ments are investigated to understand how people
monitor their retrieval. The accuracy of these judg-
ments is often of central interest, and taking the
lead from Hart (1965), accuracy is measured by
comparing a given judgment to its corresponding
criterion measure. JOLs (which are predictions of
future performance) are compared to future per-
formance, FOK judgments for predicting future
recognition of currently unrecallable information
are compared to future recognition performance,
and confidence judgments are compared to per-
formance on the criterion test being judged.
These and other judgments often demonstrate a
positive correlation with criterion performance.
For instance, Souchay, Moulin, Clarys, Taconnar,
and Isingrini (2007) had older (M age = 72 years)
and younger (M age = 27) adults attempt to
answer general-information questions and then
make an FOK judgment for any question they
did not answer. After this judgment phase, the
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Figure 19.1 Overview of meramernory monitoring and control components that occur throughout study (acquisition), retention, and
retrieval. (Adapted from Nelson & arens, 1990, to include judgments that were absent from their original framework.)
Name
Table 19.1 Names and Common Definitions of Metacognitive Judgments and Control Processes
Definition
Metacognitiue judgments
Ease-of-learning (EOL) judgments Judgments of how easy to-be-studied items will be to learn.
Judgments oflearning GOLs) Judgments of the likelihood of remembering recently studied items on an
upcoming test
Feeling-of-knowing (FOK)
judgments
Judgments of the likelihood of recognizing currently unrecallable answers on an
upcoming test
Source-monitoring judgments Judgments made during a criterion test pertaining to the source of a particular
memory
Confidence in retrieved answers Judgments of the likelihood that a response on a test is correct. Often referred to
as retrospective confidence (RC) judgments
Control processes
Selection of kind of processing Selection of strategies to employ when arrempting to commit an item to
memory
Item selection Decision about whether to study an item on an upcoming trial
Termination of study Decision to stop studying an item currently being studied
Selection of search strategy Selecting a particular strategy in order to produce a correct response during a test
Termination of search Decisions to terminate searching for a response
SoUTU: From Dunlosky, J., Serra, M., & Baker,J. M. C. (2007). Metamemory applied. In F. Durso er aI. (2nd ed.) Handbook a/applied
~Jtion. New York:Wiley.
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participants completed a recognition test for
each of the unrecalled questions. Means across
intraindividual correlations between FOK judg-
ments and recognition performance were .35 for
younger adults and .46 for older adults, indicat-
ing that people of all ages can accurately predict
future recognition performance for currently
unrecallable information (for extended primers
on metamemory measurement and analyses, see
Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008; Dunlosky & Metcalfe,
2009).
Concerning memory control, a primary ques-
tion is, How do people use monitoring to control
their memory? To address this question, researchers
often examine the relationship between a measure of
monitoring and a measure of control. For instance,
to examine control of study, JOLs made during
an initial study trial may be compared to subse-
quent self-paced study time (Mazzoni, Cornoldi,
& Marchitelli, 1990). JOLs are often negatively
related to later self-paced study time-that is, learn-
ers tend to spend more time studying information
that has been less well learned (lower JOLs) than
better learned (higher JOLs). As we discuss later,
explaining this negative relationship between JOLs
and self-paced study times-and exceptions to it-
has become a principal focus of current theories of
self-paced study.
Theory and Data of Basic Monitoring and
Control Processes
The literature on rnetarnernory includes basic
research on metamemory knowledge, monitoring,
and control; analyses of changes in metamemory
that occur throughout the life span; and the neu-
roscience and neuropsychology of monitoring and
control processes (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009).
Given the size of this literature, our overview here
must be limited in scope, so we have decided to
focus largely on twO questions: How do people
make metamemory judgments during study and
retrieval? And how do people control their study
and retrieval? To answer them, we could rely on
the literature of almost any of the measures pre-
sented in Figure 19.1. Presently, however, we con-
sider only JOLs and FOK judgments, because the
literature in both cases is extensive and offers some
basic principles that apply to all metamemory
judgments. A more thorough introduction to the
literature on each of the monitoring and control
functions in Figure 19.1 is provided by Dunlosky
and Metcalfe (2009) and Dunlosky, Serra, and
Baker (2007).
Monitoring of Study and Retrieval
HOW DO PEOPLE MAKE JUDGMENTS OF
LEARNING AND FEELING-OF-KNOWING
JUDGMENTS?
Some of the earliest theoretical work on the
bases of FOK judgments explored the degree to
which they directly measure memory. According
to this direct-access view, people's judgments reflect
the underlying strength of an item in memory
(cf. trace-access mechanisms in Nelson, Gerler, &
Narens, 1984). So, if you made aJOL after you had
just studied "dog-spoon," your judgment would
directly tap how well the association between "dog"
and "spoon" was stored in memory. Such direct
access echoes the early introspectionists' belief that
self-evaluations arise from a "direct observation of
fact," and perhaps not surprisingly, predictions from
the direct-access view have been disconfirmed with
regard to JOLs and FOK judgments.
Let's just consider a disconfirmation of this
view from the JOL literature, which will also serve
to introduce cue-based accounts for metamemory
judgments. Benjamin, Bjork, and Schwartz (1998)
had participants answer general-knowledge ques-
tions that were moderate to easy in difficulty level,
so participants could generate an answer to most
questions. Immediately after they generated an
answer, participants made a JOL concerning the
likelihood that they would recall the answer on
a test of free recall; for this test, they were given
a blank sheet of paper and had to recall only the
previously retrieved answers (without the question
cues). JOLs were related to the fluency of initial
retrieval-the faster they could generate an answer
to a general-knowledge question, the more likely
they judged that they would be able to freely recall
it on the criterion test. By contrast, the opposite
was true for the cri terion test; that is, the faster the
answer was retrieved during the initial phase, the
less likely they were to recall it during the free-recall
criterion test. Thus, people's JOLs did not directly
access how well each target answer was stored in
memory. Instead, JOLs tracked retrieval fluency:
As they retrieved answers more quickly during the
initial test, they judged the answer would be easier
to remember, even though this assessment did not
reflect actual storage strength (as assessed by free
recall on the criterion test).
This outcome, among many others, suggests
that people use processing fluency as a cue to
make JOLs. In fact, people tend to use fluency for
almost all metamemory judgments when process-
ing fluency differs across to-be-judged items (Alter
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& Oppenheimer, 2009). This conclusion not only
pertains to retrieval Ruency (as in Benjamin et al.,
1998) but other forms of processing fluency as
well. Another example involves Ruency of gener-
ating encoding strategies. In one study (Hertzog,
Dunlosky, Robinson, & Kidder, 2003), college stu-
dents studied word pairs and were asked to generate
an interactive image to associate both words. During
study, participants pressed the space bar once they
had generated an image. The time from an item's
presentation and this key press was a measure of the
Ruency of image generation. Across three experi-
ments, encoding Ruency was negatively related to
JOLs; that is, the more Ruently participants gener-
ated an image (faster latency), the higher people's
judgment that they would correctly recall the item.
Even subtle aspects of the stimulus environment can
influence encoding Ruency and JOLs. For instance,
Rhodes and Castel (2009) manipulated the Hu-
ency of perceptually processing items. Participants
listened to items that were presented at different
volumes and made a JOL after each item was pre-
sented. JOLs were higher for items presented loudly
than those presented quietly, presumably because
the former were more Ruently processed. Thus,
both encoding Ruency and retrieval Ruency influ-
ence people's JOLs.
People also use Ruency when making FOK judg-
ments. The potential influence of this cue is most
evident in Koriat's (1997) accessibility hypothesis.
According to this hypothesis, when people make an
FOK judgment for an unrecalled item, it is based on
the information that they had accessed while search-
ing for an answer. So, if you are asked, "What city
is the capital of Washington State?" you may fail to
come up with an answer, but in trying to retrieve one
from memory, you may remember "emerald," that it
begins with an "s" and that it is in the far northwest
portion of the state. For another question, "Who
wrote Moll Flanders?" you do not respond but think
the author's name begins with a "D." A prediction
from this hypothesis is that the more information
you access-and the more Ruently you access it-
prior to making an FOK judgment, the higher your
FOK is expected to be. So you may judge that you
will absolutely recognize the capital of Washington
State but will unlikely recognize the name of the
author who wrote Moll Flanders.
Importantly, Koriat (1993) proposed that the
quality of what is accessed is irrelevant-even if a lot
of incorrect information is Ruently accessed, then a
high FOK will result. In the present example, note
that all the accessed information about Washington's
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capital pointed toward Seattle (the "Emerald
City"), when in fact, the correct answer is Olympia.
By contrast, "D" is the first letter of the author's
first and last names (Daniel Defoe). Nevertheless,
according to the accessibility hypothesis, the sheer
amount retrieved and the Huency of retrieval are
most influential, so FOK judgments are expected to
be greater for the question about Washington's capi-
tal, even though the partial information retrieved
about it was incorrect. In a series of creative studies,
Koriat (1993) demonstrated the powerful inRuence
of accessibility on FOK judgments. In one experi-
ment, participants studied tetragrams-four-letter
strings that were nonwords, such as RFSC and
FKRD. A tetragram was briefly presented for study,
which was followed by a short retention interval
and a retrieval attempt. After the retrieval attempt,
an FOK judgment was made for that tetragram, and
then after all tetragrams were studied and judged,
a recognition test was administered so that FOK
accuracy could be measured. Most relevant for now,
people's FOK judgments were related to how many
letters were recalled prior to making the judgment,
even when those letters were not in the studied tet-
ragram. Put differently, FOK judgments were based
on how much information was accessed, regardless
of whether the information recalled was correct.
We have focused almost exclusively on people's
use of fluency as a basis for their judgments. More
generally, however, people appear to base their
judgments on many cues that appear to distinguish
between items in a manner that may be relevant to
criterion performance. For instance, another cue
that is available when people make FOK judgments
is the familiarity of the cue used to prompt the
retrieval attempt. The cue for "What city is the capi-
tal of Washington State?" is the question itself. For
a variety of reasons (e.g., perhaps you recently read
an article about Washington State), you may find
the cue itself familiar and hence judge that you are
likely to recognize the correct answer. Research has
established that FOK judgments are influenced by
cue familiarity in this manner (Metcalfe, Schwartz,
& Joaquim, 1993; Miner & Reder, 1994).
Given that metamemory judgments can be
based on multiple cues, researchers are beginning to
explore how various cues are integrated into a judg-
ment. For FOK judgments, Koriat and Levy-Sadot
(2001) proposed that cue familiarity has the first
influence. If your familiarity with a cue is low, then
you would spend little, if any, time attempting to
retrieve the correct answer and your FOK would be
low. However, if you are familiar with the cue, then
you would search for an answer, and any informa-
tion you accessed during this search would in turn
influence your FOK judgment. That is, accessibil-
iry is expected to have a greater influence on FOK
judgments when cue familiariry is high than when it
is low. For instance, if you were asked, "Who is the
mayor of Ravenna, Ohio?" you would likely have
no familiariry with this particular cue and quickly
respond with the lowest FOK judgment without
even attempting to search for the answer (cf Kolers
& Palef, 1976). However, if you were asked, "Who
was the second president of the United States?" if
you had familiariry with the presidents of the United
States, then you would likely search for the correct
answer. While searching, any information that you
accessed along the way would then influence your
subsequent FOK judgments. Across three experi-
ments, Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) provided
evidence consistent with this interactive hypothesis.
Moreover, Benjamin (2005) demonstrated how
cue familiary and target accessibiliry both influ-
ence people's JOLs, but the time course for their
influence differs. When JOLs are made under time
pressure, cue familiariry has an influence. Without
time pressure, people have more time to attempt
retrieval, and hence this cue has a larger influence
on people's JOLs.
To conclude this section, we will rerum to our
initial question, How do people make JOLs and
FOK judgments? Processing fluency and cue famil-
iariry have a joint influence on these judgments, but
they also can be influenced by any number of cues
that are available when the judgments are made.
For instance, in some experiments on JOLs, par-
ticipants study paired associates consisting of either
unrelated (dog-spoon) or related (king-crown)
words. JOLs are much higher for related than unre-
lated items (e.g., Carroll, Nelson, & Kirwan, 1997).
In some cases, people's JOLs are influenced by the
serial position of items on a list, with higher judg-
ments being made for items in the first positions
the primacy items) than for those in the middle of
the list (Castel, 2008; Dunlosky & Marvey, 2001).
Given the number of cues that do influence
JOLs, it is perhaps surprising that some relatively
obvious ones have a rather minimal (or inconsis-
tent) influence. For instance, when studying paired
associates, people can use numerous strategies, such
as interactive imagery (for "dog-spoon," imaging
a dog paddling in a large spoon filled with milk)
or repetition (repeating "dog-spoon" together
during study). The strategies differ in their effective-
ness, with final recall performance typically being
much higher after interactive imagery than rote
repetition. When people judge items studied under
these two different strategies, however, their JOLs
rypically do not differ for items that were studied
using imagery rather than repetition (Rabinowitz,
Ackerman, Craik, & Hinchley, 1982; Shaughnessy,
1981). Likewise, other studies have demonstrated
that people's JOLs can be insensitive to retention
interval and to the number of learning trials (e.g.,
Carroll er al., 1997; Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar,
2004; Kornell & Bjork, 2008, respectively), which
often have a substantial influence on criterion recall
performance.
Why are some cues influential (e.g., fluency),
whereas other cues (e.g., encoding strategy or num-
ber of learning trials) are nor? One answer is based
on the assumption that all judgments are inferen-
tial. That is, people use various cues to infer the
likelihood of correctly performing on the criterion
test. What makes one cue more potent than another
can partly be ascertained from Koriat and col-
leagues' (Koriat, Nussinson, Bless, & Shaked, 2008)
inference-based account that emphasizes a distinc-
tion between whether the source of an inference is
experience based (EB) or information based (IB). IB
(or theory-based) judgments rely on people's declar-
ative knowledge and beliefs about how a particular
cue influences memory. For instance, as noted ear-
lier, JOLs do not distinguish between items that are
studied by imagery versus rote repetition, and this
null effect presumably arises because most people
do not know that imagery is a more effective strat-
egy. Once people are given experience using both
strategies, however, they obtain declarative knowl-
edge that "imagery is better," and in subsequent
trials, JOLs (and other metmamemory judgments)
are higher after imagery than repetition (Hertzog,
Price, & Dunlosky, 2008).
EB judgments involve two processing stages:
"first a process that gives rise to a sheer subjective
feeling and second a process that uses that feeling
as a basis for memory predictions" (Koriat et al.,
2008, p. 118). The idea here is that various cues
trigger feelings, which in turn boost metamemory
judgments. According to Koriat et al. (2008), EB
judgments for JOLs rely on the ease with which
items are encoded or retrieved during learning,
and EB judgments for FOKs rely on the fluency of
accessing partial information when searching for a
target answer. Put differently, differences in the flu-
ency of processing presumably give rise to different
feelings that then influence people's metamemory
judgments.
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This taxonomy does provide some insight into
why various cues influence-or do not influence-
people's metamemory judgments. For instance, if
a participant does not believe a particular cue will
influence memory (IE) and if the cue does not give
rise to a metacognitive experience (EB), then it
should not influence the judgments. This situation
presumably holds for different encoding strategies
that most participants would not have experience
using in a novel associative task, such as imagery and
repetition. Another possibility is that a cue which
produces a strong metacognitive experience (e.g.,
processing fluency) could override the influence of
other IE cues. Thus, when people study "archer-
tree" and then make a ]OL for it, they may be cap-
tured by the ease of developing an image for the
word pair (and hence make a high ]OL), and alto-
gether ignore the fact that the word pair is slated to
be tested weeks after study (and hence should prob-
ably receive a low ]OL). In this way, even obvious
IE cues (e.g., retention interval) may not influence
]OLs when other strong EB cues are available in the
environment. This taxonomy is useful for explain-
ing the influence of various cues on metamemory
judgments, and it has intuitive appeal. Even so, the
taxonomy is not entirely orthogonal, because peo-
ple apparently have theories about fluency cues; that
is, learners believe that fluently processed informa-
tion is easier to remember. So this EB cue (fluency)
may actually have its influence on metamemory
judgments vis-a-vis IE processing (as in Marvey,
Dunlosky, & Guttentag, 2001).
WHEN WILL METAMEMORY JUDGMENTS BE
ACCURATE?
Hart's groundbreaking research demonstrated
that the accuracy of people's FOK judgments was
above chance, and the seminal work on ]OLs by
Arbuckle and Cuddy (1969) also revealed that they
had above-chance accuracy. Why? One straight-
forward answer is offered by cue-based accounts
of metamernory judgments, which are them-
selves founded on Egon Brunswik's lens model of
perceptual judgments (Brunswik, 1956). These
accounts highlight the importance of the three
relationships among a cue, judgment, and crite-
rion performance-which are illustrated in Figure
19.2. The relationship between cue and judgment
is referred to as cue utilization, which represents the
degree to which a cue influences (or is related to) the
judgment. k described earlier, cue utilization for
processing fluency is usually high for metamemory
judgment. A second relationship occurs between
29
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Figure 19.2 Relationships among cues, judgments, and recall
that emphasize the central role of cue utilization and diagnostic-
ity in determining judgment accuracy.
judgment and criterion performance, which rep-
resents judgment accuracy. Finally, the relationship
between cue and performance is referred to as cue
diagnosticity and represents the degree to which a
particular cue predicts criterion test performance
(cf ecological validity, Brunswik, 1956).
According to the cue-based accounts, judgment
accuracy is a function of cue urilization and cue
diagnosticiry, and hence, above-chance accuracy
occurs whenever (a) a cue influences (or is related
to) a judgment and (b) the cue itself accurately
predicts-or rather, is diagnostic of-criterion per-
formance. Above-chance accuracy is not ensured,
because even when a cue is used to make a judg-
ment, the cue itself may have nil diagnosticity or
even negative diagnosticiry, In the latter case, the
judgments would show below-chance accuracy,
with higher confidence in performance (e.g., higher
]OLs) being indicative of lower criterion perfor-
mance. In fact, the most impressive support for
such inference-based accounts of accuracy comes
from studies in which the accuracy of people's judg-
ments was zero or negative.
One excellent example comes from Benjamin
et al. (1998), which was described earlier. Recall that
participants used initial fluency of retrieving answers
to general-information questions as a cue to make
]OLs for predicting subsequent free recall of the
answers. In this case, the cue of retrieval fluency was
negatively related to cued recall: The more quickly
they retrieved answers to general-information ques-
tions (the cue), the less likely they would later recall
the answers on the criterion test. Such negative cue
diagnosticity in turn led to inaccurate ]OLs. The
general point here is that when people use a cue, its
diagnosticity will in part drive judgment accuracy.
Thus, for Benjamin er al. (1998), if retrieval fluency
on the first test had been predictive of performance
on the second (criterion) test, then JOL accuracy
should be above chance. This prediction has received
empirical support. In particular, when the first test
is a cued recall test (as in Benjamin et al., 1998) but
the second criterion test is also cued recall, then (a)
JOLs are still based on the fluency of retrieval on the
first test, but (b) now this cue of retrieval fluency is
predictive of final recall performance. As the cue is
diagnostic of criterion performance, JOL accuracy
is relatively high (Serra & Dunlosky, 2005).
This example also suggests one way that the
accuracy of JOLs and FOK judgments can be
improved or fine-tuned to match levels of perfor-
mance. Namely, to assess memory well, one must
evaluate it in contexts that yield diagnostic cues.
For instance, when studying paired associates (e.g.,
dog-spoon), two kinds oOOLs can be made. An
immediate JOL occurs immediately after an item
is studied. So one would study "dog-spoon," and
then ask, "Will I later recall spoon when shown
"dog" on the test?" Immediate JOLs are not highly
accurate because the cues available for the JOL
(e.g., processing fluency) usually are not highly
predictive of criterion performance. By contrast,
a delayed JOL occurs after other items have been
studied, so when the prompt for JOL is presented
(i.e., "dog-?"), one must try to recall the response
from memory (i.e., "spoon"). For paired associates,
the outcome of this delayed retrieval attempt is
highly diagnostic of future memory performance,
so delayed JOLs are highly accurate (Nelson &
Dunlosky, 1991).
Another avenue to improve judgment accuracy
is to provide people with experience about the
diagnosticity of various cues. For instance, as noted
earlier, people's JOLs do not differ for paired associ-
ates studied by imagery more than for those studied
by rote repetition, even though this cue (strategy
used) is highly diagnostic of performance. That is,
criterion recall performance is much higher after
imagery than repetition. When people are given
experience using these strategies during an initial
study-test trial and then make JOLs on a second
study-test trial in which imagery and repetition are
used, people's JOLs begin to favor imagery items
(Hertzog et al., 2008). Thus, even if people's JOLs
and FOK judgments are not initially accurate,
they can be tuned to better reflect memory perfor-
mance (for further discussion of a variety of tactics
to improve judgment accuracy, see Dunlosky &
Metcalfe, 2009).
THE BASES AND ACCURACY OF OTHER
METAMEMORYJUDGMENTS
Although we have focused exclusively on JOLs
and FOK judgments, the ideas described earlier
pertain to any of the judgments listed in the top
half of Figure 19.1. Each of the judgments is pre-
sumably inferential in nature in that people infer
the likelihood of criterion performance based on
available cues. Even so, they are not always empiri-
cally correlated because they also differ in other
ways. Concerning their intercorrelations, Nelson
and Leonesio (1988) had participants make mul-
tiple judgments during a multiphase experiment-
including ease-of-learning (EOL) judgments,
JOLs, and FOK judgments. Within individual
participants, the judgments were not highly cor-
related: +.19 between EOL judgments and JOLs,
+.12 between EOL judgments and FOKs, and +.17
between JOLs and FOK judgments. One explana-
tion for these small intercorrelations follows from
cue-based accounts of metamemory judgments,
because the cues available can differ as people judge
different aspects of memory. As the cues differ, the
relationship between the judgments will diverge;
however, when the same cues are available for differ-
ent judgments, the judgments will show a stronger
relationship.
These points can be illustrated with a simple
experiment. Participants study 40 paired associates;
20 pairs consist of related words (king-crown) and
20 consist of unrelated words (turtle-bean). Before
studying any pairs, participants are shown each pair
and asked to make this ease-of-learning (EOL) judg-
ment: How difficult will this item be to learn (0 =
difficult to 100 = easy)?Then, each pair is presented
individually for 6 seconds, and a JOL is made (0 =
0% likelihood of recall to 100 = 100% likelihood).
Finally, a cued recall test is administered across all
pairs, and for those in which a correct response
could not be recalled, participants made a FOK
judgment for a subsequent recognition test. Notice
that some cues are similar but others differ across
the judgments. For EOL judgments and JOLs, the
relatedness of pairs is available as a cue and it has
a major influence: Both judgments are higher for
related than unrelated pairs. In this case, the judg-
ments are highly correlated (e.g., +.71 and +.65
in two different conditions; Dunlosky & Matvey,
2001). By contrast, note that pair relatedness is
not available when people make FOK judgments,
because these judgments are made when people
cannot retrieve the response to a pair. Thus, the cue
of pair relatedness would not be available for FOK
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j gmenLS, and hence other cues would be used to
infer the likelihood that the correct answers will
be recognized. This conrext more closely matches
the method used by Nelson and Leonesio (1988),
which yielded low correlations.
Given the usefulness of a cue-based accounr for
understanding metamemory judgmenrs, a general
agenda for research has been to identify (a) the cues
that are available when any particular judgmenr is
made, (b) the degree to which people use a given
cue when making a judgmenr, (c) the diagnostic-
ity of the available cues, and, of course, (d) the
degree to which the available cues support above-
chance accuracy. Any particular research study typi-
cally only explores a subset of these issues, but the
enrire enrerprise has consistently led to converging
conclusions about all the metamemory judgmenrs
listed in Table 19.1. In particular, when monitor-
ing our memories, we do not possess the skill to
directly assess how well a memory has been stored
or how accurately it can be retrieved, and hence the
accuracy of people's metamemory judgmenrs is not
ensured. Instead, judgmenr accuracy depends on
the available cues, the degree to which those cues
are used in constructing a metamemory judgmenr,
and the diagnosticity of the cues for predicting cri-
terion performance.
Control of Memory
A major focus of metamemory research con-
cerns how people conrrol their study and retrieval
processes. In the next rwo sections, we review the
extensive literature on these control processes.
The main issues that we address here are whether
and how monitoring is used to make control
decisions.
HOW DO LEARNERS CONTROL THEIR STUDY?
To begin answering this question, we describe a
standard method used to investigate the conrrol of
study. Participants are asked to learn a list of word
pairs, and during an initial trial, each pair (e.g., cat-
boat) is presented at a fixed rate (e.g., 2 seconds an
item). Participanrs then make a ]OL for each item.
Afterward, they have another chance to study each
pair. During this self-paced study trial, participants
may be shown all the pairs in an array (such as in a
textbook page of foreign language translation equiv-
alenrs), and then they select pairs that they wanr to
restudy. Alternatively, each pair may be presenred
individually, and participants study each pair as
long as they want. A key question is, Do people use
their monitoring (as measured by ]OLs) to make
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decisions about which items to select for restudy or
to decide how long to study each item?
The modal (and nearly universal) finding from
the earliest studies using this method was a negative
relationship berween ]OLs and subsequent study
time (either item selection or self-paced study).
That is, as people rated items as more difficult to
remember (lower ]OLs), they spem more time
studying (for reviews, see Son & Kornell, 2008; Son
& Metcalfe, 2000). This relationship suggests that
people do use monitoring to conrrol their study
time. Nevertheless, it is correlational, and hence
some other variable may be responsible for why
]OLs are related to the allocation of study time. To
evaluate whether ]OLs are causally related to alloca-
tion, Metcalfe and Finn (2008) used a varianr of the
aforememioned method. On an initial study trial,
participants either studied pairs (cat-boat) once or
three times; a cued recall test then occurred (e.g.,
cat-?) , and of course, recall was greater for pairs
presented thrice than once. Next, a second study
trial occurred in which items initially presented
once were now presented three times, whereas items
initially presenred three times were presenred only
once. After each pair was studied (either once or
thrice), participanrs made a ]OL for the pair and
then made a decision about whether to restudy the
pair.
On this judgmenr-selection trial, memory per-
formance for the rwo sets of items was statistically
equivalent, because all items were studied four
times, either being studied once during the first
trial and three times during the second, or vice
versa. Thus, when people made decisions about
which items to restudy, on average, memory across
all items was the same. However, people's ]OLs
were different for the rwo sets of items: On the
second trial, people made higher ]OLs for items
that were initially studied three times on the first
trial than for those studied only once. Note that
]OLs made on the second study trial are inaccu-
rate here: People believe they will remember items
studied more time on the first trial, when in fact.
all items were studied the same number of times
when ]OLs were made, so recall did not differ
for them. Thus, if people's ]OLs drive study-time
allocation, then they should more often select to
restudy those items studied once on the first trial.
because people believe those items have been less
well learned. Across three experiments, Metcalfe
and Finn (2008) demonstrated that people use
their ]OLs to control their allocation of study time
(see also, Hines, Touron, & Hertzog, 2009).
Now that we have established that people do
use their monitoring of learning to guide srudy, an
intriguing issue becomes how it is used in allocating
study time. According to the discrepancy-reduction
model, people set a goal for learning items, and then
continue srudying each one until the goal is met.
That is, learners continue srudying an item until
the discrepancy between current learning and the
goal is completely reduced. As it takes longer to
reduce this discrepancy for more difficult-to-learn
items than easier ones, people use more time srudy-
ing the more difficult items. In this manner, the
discrepancy-reduction model predicts the modal
outcome in which people spend more time study-
ing items given lower than higher ]OLs (Son &
Metcalfe, 2000, 2005).
Although discrepancy reduction may underlie
some srudy behaviors (Benjamin & Bird, 2006),
people's allocarion of study time is more flexible. We
do more than (perhaps mindlessly) continue srudy-
ing items until they all meet the same preset goal. In
some situations, learners use monitoring to priori-
tize the easiest items for srudy and do not even srudy
the more difficult items (Son & Metcalfe, 2000;
Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999), and in other siruations,
they abandon memory monitoring in deciding how
to allocate study time across items (Ariel, Dunlosky,
& Bailey, 2009). Let's consider the former case
first. The modal outcome (i.e., more srudy to items
judged as most difficult) has typically been found
when participants are encouraged to learn all the
items on a list. To learn them all (i.e., meet a mas-
tery goal), more time would likely need to be spent
srudying the more difficult items. In some sirua-
tions, however, learners do not have mastery goals:
Perhaps they have little time to srudy and cannot
master all the items, or perhaps they do not desire
to master the list (e.g., students who only need to
pass a final exam to obtain their desired grade). If
learners are trying to efficiently meet their goals, in
both cases, they should focus on the easiest items,
because using extra effort on the more difficult ones
would be a waste of time. Consistent with such pos-
sibilities, when srudy time is limited (e.g., 15 sec-
onds to srudy 30 items) and when people set low
performance goals (e.g., learn only 6 of 30 items),
they spend the most time srudying a subset of the
easiest-to-learn items (Dunlosky & Thiede, 2004;
Son & Metcalfe, 2000).
Note that in these cases, people are using moni-
toring of learning to decide which items should be
selected and prioritized for srudy. Beyond moni-
toring, people also tend to focus their resrudy on
items that they expect will provide the most reward.
For instance, college students more often select to
srudy (a) items that are more likely (than less likely)
to appear on the criterion test and (b) items that
will be worth more points (or reward) if correctly
recalled on the criterion test (Ariel et al., 2009;
Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999). In both cases, college
students prioritize the more highly valued items for
study, regardless of whether they are difficult or easy
to learn.
Thus, students often appear to attempt to maxi-
mize their performance in the most efficient man-
ner, which is a central premise of the agenda-based
regulation (ABR) framework of study-time alloca-
tion (Ariel er al., 2009; Dunlosky, Ariel, & Thiede,
2011). According to the ABR framework, people
construct and execute agenda-or simple plans-
for allocaring srudy time to meet these dual criteria:
meeting current task goals and doing so efficiently.
Although this framework highlights the importance
of agendas, factors other than agenda construction
and execution are expected to influence how (and
how well) learners allocate their srudy time. For
instance, individual differences in working-memory
abilities can limit the quality of agenda use that
leads to the dysregulation of study time (Dunlosky
& Thiede, 2004). Bottom-up processes that are trig-
gered by prepotent responses to the stimulus envi-
ronment also can influence srudy rime (Rhodes &
Castel,2009).
The ABR framework is an example of just one of
several theories of people's allocation of srudy time
(see also, Koriar, Ma'ayan, & Nussinson, 2006;
Metcalfe, 2009; Winne & Hadwin, 1998). These
theories differ with respect to their explanatory
scope and are not mutually exclusive. For instance,
Metcalfe's (2009) region-ofproximal-Iearning frame-
work emphasizes how students in some cases pri-
oririze the easiest of the unlearned items for study,
because focusing on those items presumably would
increase the likelihood that students would effi-
ciently obtain their learning goals (Kornel! &
Metcalfe, 2006). In the context of the ABR frame-
work, prioritizing items within this region of proxi-
mal learning constitutes just one of many agendas
that people can use to allocate their time across
items. Given that research on self-regulated learning
is largely in its infancy, new evidence will likely help
to shape these recent theories as we move toward
a general theory of study-rime allocation that can
both describe how people control their srudy as well
as prescribe how they should control srudy to effi-
ciently meet their goals.
DUNLOSKY, THIEDE 293
CONTROL OF OTHER FACETS OF LEARNING
Researchers have just begun exploring how stu-
dents control other facets of learning, such as mak-
ing decisions to mass or space their study (Son,
2004; Toppino, Cohen, Davis, & Moors, 2009) or
whether they elect to test themselves during study
(Karpicke, 2009; Kornell & Bjork, 2007). Deciding
how (or whether) to use these study strategies is
important, because they can boost performance if
used properly. For instance, memory performance
is often better when study of each item is spaced
throughout a study session than when it is massed
together; fortunately, when given the choice, sru-
dents often decide to space their study (Pyc &
Dunlosky, 2010). Memory performance also ben-
efits from testing; in fact, testing oneself on previ-
ously studied items typically is better for memory
than is restudying the same items again (Roediger
& Karpicke, 2006). Unfortunately, college stu-
dents tend to underuse testing as a study strategy
(Kornell & Bjork, 2007). Understanding why stu-
dents appropriately use some effective strategies and
un de ruse others is becoming an important goal for
metamemory research, partly because it has obvious
implications for improving student scholarship.
HOW DO PEOPLE CONTROL THEIR RETRIEVAL?
A great way to begin answering this question
involves asking another one: Which country won
the World Cup in 2006? If you are a soccer fan, you
would be familiar with the World Cup. Thus, if you
cannot recall the answer, you may spend quite a bit
of time trying to retrieve it. If your first thought
was, "What is the World Cup?" you may not even
search for an answer. Understanding how people
control their retrieval has been central to metamem-
ory research on retrieval processes. Just like research
on the control of study, much of the research on the
control of retrieval has sought to understand how
people use their monitoring to control the time. As
implied by the earlier example, FOK judgments as
well as confidence in retrieved answers may playa
role in people's decisions about how long to search
for a response ("termination of search") and whether
to output a response that had been retrieved.
Concerning termination of search, Singer and
Tiede (2008) investigated whether FOK judgments
are related to search times for general-knowledge
questions that lead to "don't know" responses. That
is, when people ultimately cannot retrieve answers
to questions, do their feelings of knowing drive
them to use more or less time while searching? To
answer this question, some participants were used to
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develop FOK norms for a set of general-knowledge
questions. These participants attempted to answer
each question and then rated their confidence in
recognizing the correct answer (1 = sure I would
not recognize it to 9 = sure I would recognize it).
An average FOK for each item was computed, and
such norms across participants were positively cor-
related with individual FOK judgments from single
individuals. Thus, using them allowed Singer and
Tiede (2007) to estimate the FOK judgments of a
second group of participants who were instructed
to merely retrieve the answers. The prediction was
that the normative FOKs would be positively cor-
related with retrieval latencies (i.e., the time taken
to retrieve an answer before giving up) when partici-
pants could not retrieve an answer. Consistent with
this prediction, the correlation between FOKs and
retrieval latencies for unrecalled answers was +.50.
This outcome is intuitive: When we really feel
we know an answer, we typically spend more time
trying to pull it from memory. Even when we do
retrieve an answer to a question, however, it does
not mean we will share it with others. In fact, with-
holding incorrect responses is often just as impor-
tant as responding correctly, such as when a witness
is admonished to "tell the truth, and nothing but
the truth." Koriar and Goldsmith (1996) proposed
an influential model of memory retrieval that
explained why (and when) people would either vol-
unteer a response or withhold it (see also Higham &
Arnold, 2007). Importantly, this model illustrates
how accurate monitoring is critical for the qual-
ity of people's decision to output a response. Their
model is presented in Figure 19.3. After being asked
a question ("Input Question" in Fig. 19.3), people
attempt to retrieve candidate answers from memory.
For the question "Which country won the World
Cup in 2006?" you may have retrieved United
States, Brazil, and Italy. As answers are retrieved,
you would evaluate their quality, such as by judg-
ing your confidence in the retrieved answer from
"0" (meaning there is no way it is correct) to "1.0"
(meaning you are sure it is correct). Perhaps you
feel that there is only a .10 probability that United
States is correct, a .70 chance that Brazil is correct,
and a .40 chance that Italy is correct. In the model,
these are the assessed probabilities (Pa). If you did
not retrieve any other candidates, you would choose
the best one (in this case, Brazil), but even now,
you would not necessarily respond with "Brazil."
Instead, you would compare your assessed probabil-
ity (Pa = .70) with a response criterion (Prc). This
criterion can be influenced by a variety of factors,
Input question
retrieve <=>G <=> monitor
Situational - report option
demands / payoffs - accuracy incentive
Figure 19.3 Model of self-regulated retrieval that explains whether someone will report an answer that is retrieved when asked a given
input question. See text for details. (From Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996.)
such as the current set of payoffs for responses. For
instance, you may be taking a test over sports trivia
where the reward for a correct response is high and
where the penalty for an incorrect response is small.
In this case, your response criterion would likely be
low. By contrast, if you are on the witness stand and
were told not to report any incorrect evidence, you
may set a very high response criterion. Let's assume
that you set a Pre at .40, and hence you would vol-
unteer the response "Brazil," because your assessed
probability exceeds your response criterion; that is,
Pa (.70) > Pre (.40).
Based on this example, it should be clear why
monitoring accuracy is critical for the quality (and
quantity) of what responses people will volunteer.
Concerning accuracy, if your assessed probabili-
ties do not reflect the actual probabilities of being
correct (i.e., poor judgment accuracy), then incor-
rect answers could be volunteered. This mistake is
illustrated in the earlier example: Italy is the cor-
rect answer, so the assessed probabilities were not
accurate. Thus, your overconfidence in Brazil's
team led you to respond incorrectly. If instead, Italy
had a much higher Pa (e.g., close to 1.0), then the
enhanced judgment accuracy would have led to the
correct response.
To evaluate this implication of the model, Koriat
and Goldsmith (1996) used the following method.
Participants were forced to answer general-knowledge
questions so that the experimenters would know
what each participant's best candidate answer was
for every question; for each answer, participants
provided a confidence judgment, which was used as
a measure of Pa. Next, the participants answered the
questions again, but this time, they could withhold
answers-that is, they were not forced ro respond.
As important, two different sets of questions were
used. Some were considered standard questions and
supported high levels of judgment accuracy and
some were deceptive and led to inaccurate judg-
ments. The latter consisted of questions that people
often answer incorrectly with high confidence; for
instance, "What is the capital of Australia?" is often
confidently answered with "Syndey" when the cor-
rect answer is "Canberra." During the first round of
questions, performance was greater for the standard
questions (28%) than for the deceptive ones (12%).
This outcome is not surprising, given that it merely
demonstrates that the deceptive questions are in
fact deceptive. The more important outcomes con-
cern performance for the free-report phase. If par-
ticipants use their confidence judgments to make
decisions about which answers to withhold, their
performance should increase for standard questions
bur may not change for deceptive ones. As expected,
the percentage of accurate recall for the free-report
phase was 75% for the standard questions, but it was
only 21% for the deceptive questions. According to
the model, people had difficulties with the deceptive
questions because they would have failed to with-
hold incorrect responses that were inadvertently
held with high confidence.
How long one persists in trying to retrieve an
item and whether one elects to respond are not the
only facets of retrieval that are under people's con-
trol. Others include (a) whether to even attempt to
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reuieve an answer or to use some other means to
obtain one and (b) decisions abour the grain size of
information to report. For the former, Reder and
Riner (1992) investigated factors that influence
people's decision to retrieve an answer to a difficult
math problem or to compute it. People attempted
retrieval when they believed problems were famil-
iar (even when they were actually not familiar
with them) and elected to compure answers when
familiarity was low. For the latter, the instruction
to "speak the truth and nothing but the truth" may
influence the grain size of reports; in this case, people
will tend to give more general reports that are more
likely to be true and withhold details that have a
higher chance of not being accurate (cf. Goldsmith,
Koriar, & Weinberg-Eliezer, 2002). According to
Ackerman and Goldsmith (2008), people control
the grain size of their reporrs (either by providing
more precise or more coarse answers) in order to be
both informative and confident in their responses.
Although we have much to learn about how people
control their retrieval and whether such control
can be optimal (for discussions of oprimaliry, see
Higham, 2007), one conclusion is certain: People
do use their monitoring to make decisions about
how long to search for answers and whether to vol-
unteer responses. Thus, as with the control of study,
accurate monitoring is essential for effective self-
regulation.
Conclusion
In the present chapter, we provided an introduc-
tion to many of the common measures, methods,
and issues that drive research on metamemory. Some
major conclusions included that people's monitoring
judgments can be accurate, but only when the cues
that are used to construct the judgments are diag-
nostic of criterion performance. As cue diagnosticity
increases, then the upper limit on judgment accu-
racy also increases. Regardless of judgment accuracy,
monitoring is also used in the service of controlling
memory, whether it be in deciding which items to
prioritize for study or when to volunteer (or with-
hold) a response during retrieval. Our overview,
however, did not cover the entire field, which has
sought to answer many intriguing questions about
metamemory. How does metamernory develop in
childhood and does it decline as we age? Do animals
have metamemory-cio they know when they know
and when they do not? How do individual differ-
ences in metamemory influence educational our-
comes? What are the neurological underpinnings
of metamernory, and what kinds of brain insult
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and psychological disorders lead to disruptions
of metamemory? For those interested in further
exploring metamemory, answers to these and other
questions are available in a variety of more extensive
sources (e.g., Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Hacker,
Dunlosky, & Graesser, 2009; Higham & Leboe,
2011; Terrace & Metcalfe, 2005).
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